Antitrust Focus on Interlocking Directorates Raises Risk for Private Equity and Venture Capital Firms | Advisories | Arnold & Porter (2025)

The federal antitrust authorities — the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) — are both pursuing aggressive enforcement agendas. In particular, both agencies have specifically announced increased enforcement efforts around Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits, subject to certain exceptions, a person from serving “as a director or officer in any two corporations … that are … competitors….”¹

Federal antitrust enforcers have highlighted both private equity and venture capital firms as enforcement targets. FTC Commissioner Lina Khan specifically noted the FTC’s intention to use Section 8 to challenge potentially illegal ownership structures involving private equity (PE) firms in the health care space,² concerns which were underscored by the joint FTC, DOJ, and Health and Human Services announcement of a new portal design to aid reporting of anticompetitive practices in the health care sector.³ DOJ Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Jonathan Kanter has also expressed enforcement focus on Section 8, noting DOJ is “continually looking for interlocking directorates imposed by private equity, venture capital, and corporate venture capital firms and others.”⁴

In light of these enforcement priorities, private equity investors should seek antitrust counsel to ensure any board rights or board appointments do not run afoul of Section 8’s restrictions and be particularly mindful of any such risks that might occur in the merger and acquisition context.

Historically, Section 8 has only “rarely been enforced in the over 100 years since its passage, and even less so in the past four decades.”⁵ However, in recent years both DOJ and FTC have pledged to “ramp up efforts”in this area⁶ and “revitalize[e]” Section 8 enforcement.⁷

In 2023, FTC announced a settlement resolving interlocking directorate concerns associated with a proposed partial acquisition of natural gas producer EQT Corporation (EQT) by private equity firm Quantum Energy Partners (Quantum), which also held stakes in natural gas producer Tug Hill Corp. and pipeline operator Xcl Midstream. The FTC alleged that the transaction — which would have granted Quantum the right to nominate its own chief executive officer or another Quantum designee for election as a member of the EQT board of directors — violated Section 8.⁸ To resolve FTC concerns, Quantum and EQT agreed to several commitments, including requiring Quantum to forego any right to appoint a member of EQT’s board of directors and prohibiting Quantum from serving on the board of “any of the top seven Appalachian Basin natural gas producers” without prior FTC approval for 10 years.⁹ FTC is also reportedly scrutinizing the proposed acquisition of Subway IP LLC by Roark Capital Group, for potential interlocks that may occur between the acquired company and board seats held by Roark Capital Group at other food retail companies.¹⁰

DOJ has also required proposed transactions to be restructured to avoid concerns regarding interlocking directorates.¹¹ And more recently, DOJ has also made clear it is investigating potential illegal interlocks independent of any pending merger or acquisition. DOJ Deputy Assistant Attorney General Andrew Forman noted that DOJ is acting proactively to identify and investigate potential Section 8 violations.¹² Indeed, DOJ has credited its investigations over the last several years as unwinding or preventing “interlocks involving at least two dozen companies.”¹³

Simultaneous service as an officer or director of two different competing companies may create antitrust risks through the improper disclosure of competitively sensitive information or coordination between the competitors.¹⁴ Section 8 of the Clayton Act is a prophylactic statute designed to prevent this type of conduct by prohibiting such dual service, subject to certain exceptions, regardless of whether any anticompetitive conduct actually occurs due to the interlock.

For Section 8 to apply to an interlock, the following jurisdictional thresholds must be met:

“Competitive sales” are defined as “the gross revenues for all products and services sold by one corporation in competition with the other …”¹⁸ The statute does not offer a definition of “in competition,” but courts and the FTC have considered factors such as whether the products at issue perform the same function, whether the two companies vie for the business of the same purchasers, and industry perception of competition. ¹⁹

While the text of Section 8 refers to service as an officer or director of a corporation and does not cover interlocks implicating noncorporate entities such as limited liability corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, FTC has taken the position that its restrictions also extend to noncorporate entities.²⁰

Section 8 may be enforced by the DOJ, FTC, and private plaintiffs, including state attorneys general. Typically, the remedy for a prohibited interlock is injunctive relief, but private parties also may seek treble damages.²¹ While damages are theoretically available to a private party enforcing Section 8 if injury could be shown, no case has yet resulted in damages. Importantly, both the interlocked corporations and the interlocking directors themselves can be found in violation of Section 8.²²

Notably, even if an interlock is exempt under Section 8, companies and individuals can still be liable for anticompetitive conduct that might arise as a result of the interlock, such as Sherman Act Section 1 violations (like bid-rigging or price-fixing).

Overlapping directors among companies today may result from the desire of each company to seek the most qualified and experienced outside directors. An individual with extensive familiarity with a particular industry due to his or her professional involvement in that industry is frequently viewed as a desirable outside director for a second company in that industry.²⁵ The same logic may underscore a PE/VC firm’s desire to make multiple investments in a particular industry segment. However, where PE/VC funds are not using a single platform company for all investments in a particular sector, multiple appointments or investments in the same industry can raise particular risk for a problematic interlock if made in two companies that are competitors.

For example, even if an interlock between two competing start-up companies falls into a Section 8 exemption because the start-ups do not yet have significant sales, these interlocks must be carefully monitored — not only for potential risk that may arise if the companies grow, but also for other antitrust risks that may arise between the two companies independent of Section 8.

FTC and DOJ leadership continue to focus antitrust enforcement efforts on private equity firms.²⁶ In a 2022 enforcement action, for example, Democratic FTC Commissioners warned that private equity firms’ business models “may in some instances distort incentives” or “hinder competition.”²⁷ In response, the Republican Commissioners at the time critiqued the statement as reflecting “distaste for private equity as a business model, instead of the facts uncovered in the investigation.”²⁸ However, DOJ has also focused on private equity as an area for antitrust scrutiny. At a recent conference, DOJ Deputy Assistant Attorney General Andrew Forman specifically highlighted Section 8 as an important statute for enforcement in industries “attracting a lot of investment.”²⁹

This ongoing enforcement attention on investors (including PE and VC firms), along with a renewed attention to Section 8, is a good reminder for companies and counsel to do their due diligence regarding interlocking directorates and monitor any board rights or appointments for compliance with antitrust laws.